Abstract
Many pathogens used in bioweapons programmes are animal disease or zoonotic agents. Their use has potentially devastating impacts for animal health, human health, food security and economies. Unlike other weapons, biological agents are inherently difficult to control, and current technological advances coupled with global instability are increasing the risks of misuse. Addressing this threat requires a distinct approach from that applied to other weapons of mass destruction, and must be grounded in strong multi-sectoral collaboration and action. Veterinary Services are essential players in the fight against biological weapons, yet their role remains undervalued. Greater recognition and investment are needed to ensure that Veterinary Services can fulfil their critical role in safeguarding against biological weapons.
From the 5th Century BCE to Today: The Growing Threat of Biological Weapons
Long before microbes were identified as the cause of infectious diseases, humans were already exploiting them as weapons. For millennia – well before the advent of microbiology and epidemiology – warriors were unwittingly weaponising pathogens. In the 5th century BCE, Herodotus described the Scythians deliberately dipping arrowheads in a mixture of rotting flesh, faeces and snake venom. Later, in 1346, the Tartars besieging the city of Caffa catapulted plague-infected corpses over its walls to spread disease among the inhabitants. Historical records also frequently recount the deliberate contamination of drinking water supplies with dead animals.
Fast-forward to the 19th century: the scientific community had now formally accepted the germ theory of disease, recognising microorganisms – rather than miasma (‘bad air’) – as the true cause of infection. This breakthrough laid the foundation for modern microbiology and marked the dawn of modern biowarfare, biocrime and bioterrorism [1]. By the end of the century, nations were applying this new understanding, along with technological advances that enabled large-scale cultivation and dissemination of pathogens, to develop structured biological weapons programmes. In the 20th century, non-state actors also began exploring this relatively low-tech but highly disruptive means of spreading fear and chaos [2-5].
Recognising the devastating potential and uncontrollable nature of biological agents, the international community introduced two treaties to address the growing threat of biological and chemical weapons. The first was the Geneva Protocol of 1925 (formally, the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare) [6]. While it banned the use of chemical and biological weapons in warfare, it did not prohibit their development or stockpiling. As a result, several countries continued pursuing biological weapons capabilities for decades, with documented and horrifying consequences.
The next major milestone was the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction [7], more commonly known as the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC). Coming into force in 1975, the BWC built upon the Geneva Protocol by prohibiting not only the use, but also the development, production, acquisition, transfer and stockpiling of biological and toxin weapons. As of July 2025, the BWC counts 189 states as signatories, including 172 of the 183 Members of the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH) [8].
Many pathogens used – or considered for use – in bioweapons programmes are animal pathogens or zoonotic agents. Most are WOAH-listed diseases [9] reflecting their significant impacts on animal health, public health, food security and economies. These agents occur naturally in the environment (for example, Bacillus anthracis, which causes anthrax, can be found in pastures, burial grounds and diseased animals) and are also stored in veterinary laboratories. Their natural availability, combined with the relatively low technological requirements for propagation and dissemination, makes them attractive to non-state actors – including terrorists.
A multi-sectoral strategy is essential, and both the World Organisation for Animal Health and the National Veterinary Services of its Members have a critical role to play in supporting the implementation of international treaties.
Veterinary Services and International Organisations: A Joint Approach to Biological Weapons Control
To address threats from non-state actors, the United Nations (UN) Security Council adopted Resolution 1540 in 2004 [10]. This resolution obliges all UN Member States to prohibit and prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and their delivery systems to non-state actors such as terrorists and criminal groups.
The unique characteristics of biological weapons – including their dual-use nature and close relationship to naturally occurring pathogens – demand a different control and regulatory approach compared to other WMDs. A multi-sectoral strategy is essential, and both WOAH and the National Veterinary Services of its Members [8] have a critical role to play in supporting the implementation of international treaties.
Supporting these treaties, Veterinary Services contribute by:
- Safeguarding dual-use biological agents and knowledge (i.e. materials, technologies or expertise with both peaceful and malicious potential).
- Ensuring preparedness, early detection, response and reporting of unusual animal disease outbreaks, particularly those inconsistent with natural patterns.
- Coordinating with public health, law enforcement and national security sectors.
- Contributing to and implementing national biosafety and biosecurity frameworks.
- Supporting international cooperation and promoting responsible scientific conduct.
- Facilitating national compliance with international non-proliferation treaties [11].
Today, technological advances and global instability may be heightening the risk of misuse of biological agents, and Veterinary Services are on the front line of efforts to prevent and mitigate these threats.
Underinvestment in National Veterinary Services Weakens Cross-Government Security Frameworks
Despite their critical role in preventing the deliberate misuse of animal pathogens, the contribution of Veterinary Services is often overlooked. This oversight can lead to underinvestment in their security functions, limited awareness among veterinarians and missed opportunities to integrate Veterinary Services in cross-government security and emergency management frameworks.
A WOAH study, for example, revealed that fewer than half of all national emergency management plans include Veterinary Services [12]. Raising awareness of their essential role – particularly among national security actors – can help elevate their profile within government. Framing their contribution in terms of national and global security is likely to resonate strongly with policy-makers.
In several countries, Veterinary Services are already playing an active role in Biological Threat Reduction frameworks, including supporting the implementation of international treaties. Concrete actions they can take include:
- Actively engaging in cross-government security frameworks.
- Contributing to the development and operationalisation of national biosecurity strategies.
- Designing and exercising national contingency plans, including deliberate-introduction scenarios.
- Raising awareness and training Veterinary Services staff on risks and preparedness for deliberate biological threats.
- Engaging proactively with law enforcement and security agencies, including the BWC national contact point.
- Contributing to the preparation of BWC national confidence-building measure reports.
While this list is not exclusive, it highlights practical ways in which Veterinary Services can strengthen national and international biological threat reduction efforts.
The deliberate use of biological agents as weapons has a long history. Today, technological advances and global instability may be heightening the risk of their misuse, and Veterinary Services are on the front line of efforts to prevent and mitigate these threats. Through early detection, cross-sector coordination and regulation of high-risk biological materials, they play a vital role in safeguarding international security while protecting both animal and human health.
Main image: ©ChatGPT
References
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