The Global Health Risks of Consuming Dead Animals

From Taboo to Threat

Cultural taboos once served as powerful deterrents against the consumption of animals that died naturally without bloodletting. Such dead animals in many African communities, including the author’s own, were regarded as unclean, spiritually unsafe and unfit for human consumption. These prohibitions even extended to imported frozen fish labeled as ‘mortuary fish’, believed to have died long before freezing. The social sanctions for breaking such norms were severe, ranging from shame and social exclusion to loss of status. In practice, these cultural safeguards functioned as community-driven food safety systems, protecting people from foodborne diseases and zoonotic infections.

Today, these cultural norms are eroding. Economic hardship and food insecurity have driven some communities and traders to adopt practices that compromise health and safety. During one of my field assignments, while passing through the bustling Onitsha Market in Nigeria, I observed that dead poultry were openly sold at discounted prices. The dead birds were unloaded from a pickup truck and quickly bought by vendors and local traders, with little visible concern for the cause of death or prior treatment history. 

The normalisation of a once-prohibited practice raises urgent questions: What caused the animals’ death? Were they treated with antibiotics or veterinary drugs shortly before dying? The inability to answer such questions underscores the opacity of informal livestock markets and the public health risks they pose. 

Zoonotic Disease and AMR: A Double Threat

Dead or diseased animals can serve as reservoirs for zoonotic pathogens transmissible from animals to humans. Poultry carcasses, for instance, can harbour Salmonella, Campylobacter, avian influenza viruses or Newcastle disease virus. When improperly handled or cooked, these pathogens can spread rapidly through communities, triggering localised outbreaks with the potential to escalate into wider epidemics [1]. 

Past outbreaks, such as avian influenza (H5N1, H7N9), demonstrated how informal poultry trade and poor biosecurity can amplify disease transmission. In many cases, pathogens have crossed species barriers under conditions of weak surveillance, making humans both victims and vectors of transmission [2]. 

Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) in this scenario is equally alarming. Sick animals on farms are frequently treated with antibiotics, often without veterinary oversight, accurate dosing or adherence to withdrawal periods. When such animals die and are resold for consumption, their meat may contain antibiotic residues or resistant bacteria. Consuming contaminated meat exposes humans to multi-drug-resistant organisms (MDROs), complicating treatment and increasing morbidity and mortality. AMR already contributes to nearly five million deaths worldwide each year [3]. The informal trade in dead animals accelerates this crisis, turning communities into unmonitored points of resistance transmission. 

The Urgent Need for Coordinated Multisectoral Intervention

Preventing the consumption and trade of dead or diseased animals must be recognised as both a food safety priority and a cornerstone of global health security. The following actions outline a roadmap for coordinated response.  

1. Expanded Biosafety and Biosecurity Training

Veterinarians, livestock farmers, animal handlers and market operators should receive regular, evidence-based training in biosafety and biosecurity. Such training should extend beyond basic food safety to cover emerging zoonoses and their transmission pathways, AMR risks linked to the misuse of veterinary drugs, and dual-use research of concern to ensure that biotechnology innovations are applied responsibly.  

Equipping frontline workers with the tools and knowledge to identify and mitigate risks enhances early detection, and prevents spillover. Evidence indicates that targeted training programmes lower outbreak incidence in livestock systems and improve compliance with veterinary standards [4]. 

2. Regulatory Oversight and Market Surveillance

Regulatory authorities must intensify inspections and enforcement in informal livestock markets. Legislation prohibiting the sale of dead animals should not remain dormant but be actively enforced, with clear legal and economic consequences for violators. 

Equally critical is the reinforcement of animal health surveillance systems capable of detecting emerging pathogens before they spread to human populations. The integration of cutting-edge tools such as genomics sequencing, digital bio-surveillance and AI-assisted outbreak prediction models can transform surveillance capacity. 

For example, a global study analysing wastewater from 44 international flights to Australia detected genetic markers of five high-priority AMR organisms, including resistance to last-resort antibiotics, even after aircraft sanitation [5]. This finding demonstrates the potential of innovative surveillance methods to serve as early–warning systems for AMR transmission across borders. 

3. Public Education and Risk Communication Campaigns

Cultural and behavioural change is essential. Communities must be made aware of the dangers of consuming dead or diseased animals, not only because of the immediate risk of food-borne illness but also due to longer-term threats such as zoonotic diseases and AMR. 

Public health campaigns, led by Veterinary Authorities and Services, should engage community and cultural leaders, as well as media partners to reshape norms and highlight the real-world consequences of unsafe practices through relatable examples. These campaigns should also promote safer alternatives, including improved food sourcing and preventive animal health measures, while actively countering misinformation and disinformation that undermine public trust and compliance. 

Global evidence suggests that targeted communication is effective. Between 2016 and 2019, nearly 200 countries achieved a 20% reduction in antimicrobial use in veterinary care through the adoption of vaccines, probiotics and enhanced biosecurity [6]. This demonstrates that prevention, achieved through education and system strengthening, can deliver measurable reductions in health risks. 

4. A One Health Approach to Global Health Security

The threats posed by the consumption of dead animals cannot be addressed in isolation. A One Health approach is essential, integrating human, animal and environmental health. 

At the 2024 High-Level Meeting on Antimicrobial Resistance during the 79th United Nations General Assembly, world leaders pledged a 10% reduction in AMIR-related deaths by 2030, emphasising cross-sectoral strategies for stewardship, surveillance and regulation. Translating such commitments into action requires embedding the One Health approach within national and community–level practices.  

A global challenge

The uncontrolled consumption and resale of dead animals is not merely a local concern but a direct threat to global health security. This practice embodies the dangerous convergence of zoonotic risk, AMR and biosecurity failure. Left unchecked, it could accelerate the next pandemic or intensify the silent crisis of AMR. 

To confront this challenge, governments, Veterinary Services and communities must collaborate under a unified One Health framework. Prioritising biosafety/biosecurity training, enforcing regulatory oversight, deploying innovative technologies and fostering global partnerships are urgent actions. Equally vital is community education, which restores protective norms while addressing the economic drivers of unsafe practices. Investing in animal health is, ultimately, an investment in global health security.

Main image: ©PamelaJoeMcFarlane, Getty Images

References 

[1] Morshdy AE, Ibrahim MH, Tharwat A, Darwish WS. Effect of surface contamination on the shelf life of poultry carcasses: a review. Egypt. J. Vet. Sci. 2025 Dec 1;56(13):225-39. https://doi.org/10.21608/ejvs.2025.372316.2753  

[2] Hinjoy S, Thumrin P, Sridet J, Chaiyaso C, Suddee W, Thukngamdee Y, et al. An overlooked poultry trade network of the smallholder farms in the border provinces of Thailand, 2021: implications for avian influenza surveillance. Front. Vet. Sci. 2024 Feb 7;11:1301513. https://doi.org/10.3389/fvets.2024.1301513  

[3] Sati H, Carrara E, Savoldi A, Hansen P, Garlasco J, Campagnaro E, et al. The WHO bacterial priority pathogens list 2024: a prioritisation study to guide research, development, and public health strategies against antimicrobial resistance. Lancet Infect. Dis. 2025 Apr 14. https://doi.org/10.1016/s1473-3099(25)00118-5  

[4] Shehu N, Luka P, Bente D, Weka R, Weldon C, Pam DD, et al. Using One Health training for interprofessional team building: implications for research, policy, and practice in Nigeria. Front. Public Health. 2024 Jul 30;12:1375424. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpubh.2024.1375424  

[5] Liu Y, Smith WJ, Gebrewold M, Ashbolt NJ, Keenum I, Simpson SL, et al. Aircraft lavatory wastewater surveillance for movement of antimicrobial resistance genes: a proof-of-concept study. Microbiol. Spectr. 2025 May 28;13(7):e00569-25. https://doi.org/10.1128/spectrum.00569-25  

[6] Ruckert A, Gonçalo das Neves C, Amuasi J, Hindmarch S, Brux C, Winkler AS, et al. One Health as a pillar for a transformative pandemic treaty. Geneva (Switzerland): Graduate Institute of Geneva; 2021. Available at: https://www.graduateinstitute.ch/sites/internet/files/2021-11/policybrief-onehealth-v3.pdf (accessed on 24 September 2025).