From Fiction to Reality: The Threat of Agro-Terrorism

‘I don’t think it would be too much to say, gentlemen, that if such an attack could be launched, and it can only be countered by slaughtering the poultry and animals and burning the crops, we would be a bankrupt country within a matter of months. We would literally be down on our knees, begging for bread!’ [1]

In the James Bond novel, On Her Majesty’s Secret Service [1], the villain Blofeld plots to cripple the United Kingdom (UK) by releasing foot and mouth disease (FMD), destroying the country’s livestock sector – essentially, an act of agro-terrorism. Flashforward to 2001, the UK faced its worst animal epidemic in history. FMD spread rapidly across more than 2,000 farms and into neighbouring countries including Ireland, France and the Netherlands, triggering a major national and international crisis.

To contain and eradicate the virus, the UK Government ordered the culling of both infected animals and those linked epidemiologically. More than six million animals were slaughtered, devastating rural communities and costing the UK economy over £8 billion through agricultural and food chain disruption, compensation payments to farmers and a sharp decline in tourism [2]. Beyond the financial toll, the epidemic had a lasting effect on farmers, veterinarians, responders and rural communities, particularly on their mental health.

The outbreak stemmed from a farmer illegally feeding untreated waste to his pigs and failing to notify the Competent Authority when his animals got sick – an act of agro-crime. But what if such an event were deliberate? How would we prevent or detect it? What if the pathogen was zoonotic and therefore able to transmit between animals and humans? And how should we prepare?

Safeguarding Agriculture: Animal Pathogens as National Security Risks

The World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH) and the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) define agro-crime as unlawful acts or omissions related to animals or their products that violate legislation and have negative consequences on animal health, animal welfare, public health, food safety and authenticity or national security. Agro-terrorism is a sub-set of agro-crime: the deliberate release of pathogens to cause illness or death in animals with a view to intimidating or coercing a government or civil population to further political or social objectives [3]. While agro-crime occurs daily, documented cases of agro-terrorism are rare. This relative scarcity means that agro-terrorism garners limited attention from national governments, despite its potential devastating consequences.

The agricultural sector is highly vulnerable to agro-terrorism and is often regarded as a ‘soft-target’. Modern agriculture depends on complex supply chains, with animals moving from farms to markets to slaughterhouses, and their products continuing onwards to food processing facilities. Animals and their products can also move transnationally by air, land and sea. While the sector has evolved over centuries to maximise production and efficiency, biosecurity has not kept pace. Livestock are also vulnerable to disease, notably those defined by WOAH as ‘listed diseases’ [4]. These pathogens can spread across borders, causing severe impacts on animal health and welfare, livelihoods, trade, economies and public health.

A comparison of WOAH’s listed diseases [4] with the Australia Group’s export control list of animal pathogens [5] reveals 32 pathogens in common, including FMD, anthrax and high pathogenicity avian influenza. These agents are capable of causing high morbidity and mortality, spreading rapidly, and are relatively easy to produce, transport and disseminate. Once introduced into a population, they are notoriously difficult to diagnose, control and eradicate. In effect, WOAH’s listed diseases could serve as a bioweapons ‘shopping list’, a risk amplified by emerging technologies and weaponised mis- and disinformation campaigns [6]. Together, these factors elevate agro-terrorism to a critical, yet often under-recognised, global health threat.

Health and Security: A Joint Front Against Agro-Terrorism

The vulnerability of the agricultural sector combined with the growing sophistication of hostile actors, demands a rethink of how we address agro-terrorism. Veterinary Services and public health agencies must cooperate more closely with law enforcement and security. Yet, many barriers stand in the way of effective cooperation: limited trust between sectors, differing terminology, unclear roles and responsibilities, and the absence of formal collaboration frameworks. Veterinary Services are also chronically under-resourced – WOAH data show that only 40% of Members meet the minimum capacity for emergency preparedness, as identified through Performance of Veterinary Services evaluation missions [7,8].

Overcoming these challenges requires sustained efforts to foster multi-agency cooperation. The first step is dialogue: law enforcement and health agencies must build relationships and develop a strong understanding of their respective mandates and responsibilities in preventing, detecting, preparing for, and responding to agro-terrorism. From there, memorandums of understanding or similar agreements can formalise cooperation and mobilise the resources needed to make it operational. With a legal mandate to work together, health agencies and security services can begin sharing intelligence and creating contingency plans and procedures that incorporate other relevant sectors. Joint capacity-building activities, such as training and simulation exercises [9], allow agencies to enhance emergency readiness. By practicing collaboration in peacetime, agencies will be better positioned to conduct joint threat credibility assessments and joint criminal and epidemiology investigations in the event of suspected agro-terrorism.

Agro-terrorism is not a matter of if but when. The vulnerabilities of agriculture and livestock systems are too great to ignore. To avert potential disaster, governments and the global community must strengthen biosecurity by investing resources, taking concrete actions to improve defences and fostering multi-agency cooperation. If we continue to underestimate the risk of agro-terrorism today, we may pay the price tomorrow, finding ourselves ‘down on our knees’, just as the Bond villain Blofeld envisioned.

Main image: ©Joana Maia Pita

References

[1] Fleming I. On Her Majesty’s Secret Service. London (United Kingdom): Jonathan Cape; 1963.

[2] Thompson D, Muriel P, Russell D, Osborne P, Bromley A, Rowland M, et al. Economic costs of the foot and mouth disease outbreak in the United Kingdom in 2001. Rev. Sci. Tech. 2002 Dec;21(3):675-87. https://doi.org/10.20506/rst.21.3.1353

[3] Donachie D, Ewann F, Poudevigne F. Animal Agrocrime: An Overlooked Biological Threat. Health Secur. 2023 Sep-Oct;21(5):415-420. https://doi.org/10.1089/hs.2022.0144

[4] World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH). Diseases listed by WOAH. Paris (France): WOAH; 2024. Available at: https://www.woah.org/fileadmin/Home/eng/Health_standards/tahc/current/chapitre_oie_listed_disease.pdf (accessed on 3 September 2025).

[5] Australia Group. List of human and animal pathogens and toxins for export control. Canberra (Australia): Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade; 2023. Available at: https://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/minisite/theaustraliagroupnet/site/en/human_animal_pathogens.html (accessed on 22 September 2025).

[6] World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH). Countering disinformation and misinformation in animal health emergencies. Paris; 2024; 22 pp. https://doi.org/10.20506/woah.3472

[7] World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH). Implementation of WOAH standards: the Observatory Annual Report Publication Series. Paris; 2022; 149 pp. https://doi.org/10.20506/obs.3339

[8] Hamilton K, Bastos B. Veterinary Services: Guardians Against Biological Weapons. World Organisation for Animal Health; 2025. Available at: https://theanimalecho.woah.org/en/sci-tech-articles/ (in press).

[9] World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH). Simulation exercises. Paris (France): WOAH; 2024. Available at: https://www.woah.org/en/what-we-do/animal-health-and-welfare/disease-data-collection/simulation-exercises/ (accessed on 3 September 2025).