Engaging Animal Health and Veterinary Stakeholders with the Biological Weapons Convention

The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), which 189 states have joined, prohibits the deliberate use of pathogens against humans, animals or plants. The targeting of livestock with biological weapons could have severe and far-ranging consequences. Past animal disease outbreaks have produced economic shocks [1], threatened global food supply chains [2] and posed public health risks to humans [3]. Closer collaboration between national stakeholders and the veterinary sector in BWC-related activities is crucial to improving resilience against deliberate threats to animal health. The five-yearly BWC Review Conferences have encouraged States Parties ‘to continue strengthening existing international organizations and networks working on infectious diseases within their respective mandates’, and have specifically acknowledged the role of the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH) in this regard [4].

Biological weapons can harm animals in multiple ways. Pathogens may be deliberately deployed against specific animal populations or may infect animals following accidental release, for example from a laboratory. Attacks targeting humans or plants can also pose risks to animals: over 80% of potential biowarfare agents are zoonotic [5], meaning their release could lead to both human and animal infections regardless of the intended target. Attacks on crops could also harm animals indirectly by depleting feed sources and damaging ecosystems, endangering the livelihoods of the 1.3 billion individuals who depend on them [6], of which 930 million reside in Africa or South Asia [7]. Moreover, disinformation following a biological incident can inflict serious economic damage on animal sectors through perceived rather than actual threats, such as false claims of contamination in food products. 

Successful collaboration between the BWC and animal health communities requires shared understanding of these risks and priorities. Veterinary professionals are often the first to detect, report and investigate suspicious animal disease outbreaks at regional or national levels, making their engagement essential. BWC States Parties are encouraged to submit annual confidence-building measures (CBMs) on national biological activities, some of which relate directly to animal health. Article X of the Convention also calls for the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials, and scientific and technological information to promote the peaceful use of biological science and international cooperation to strengthen collective preparedness.  

Attendance of Veterinary and Animal Health Professionals at BWC Meetings

BWC meetings provide opportunities for States Parties to shape the direction of the international regime governing biological weapons. International organisations, non-governmental organisations and civil society groups also contribute by offering expert input that inform these discussions. 

This article considered eight meetings: the 2022 Ninth Review Conference, its 2021 Preparatory Committee, and all six sessions of the Working Group on the Strengthening of the Convention held between 2023 and 2025. The proportion of delegates with professional backgrounds in veterinary medicine or animal health – whether representing national delegations or other entities – is shown in Figure 1. 

A total of 45 appearances by 34 different animal health professionals were recorded across BWC meetings. Of these, 35 (78%) were as part of national delegations, representing institutions such as animal health and vaccine research centres, veterinary surveillance units and national agricultural organisations. Nine attendees (20%) were affiliated with intergovernmental organisations – namely WOAH and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), both of which have regularly addressed BWC meetings. One additional attendee with an animal health background represented the International Science Council. No meeting held between 2021 and 2025 recorded more than 2% of participants from veterinary or animal health backgrounds; however, the three most recent Working Group sessions showed a steady attendance from animal health stakeholders exceeding 0.5%. 

Animal Health Information in Confidence-Building Measure Submissions

The BWC CBMs aim to prevent or reduce the occurrence ambiguities, doubts and suspicions among States Parties while improving international cooperation in peaceful biological activities. Each State Party is called upon to submit information annually through a series of standardised forms covering the following areas: 

• Exchange of data on research centres (Form A1). 

• Exchange of information on national biological defence research and development programmes (Form A2). 

• Exchange of information on outbreaks of infectious diseases and similar occurrences caused by toxins within a State Party (Form B). 

• Recent publication of results of biological research directly related to the Convention (Form C). 

• Declaration of legislation, regulations and other measures related to the BWC (Form E). 

• Declaration of past activities in offensive and/or defensive biological research and development programmes (Form F). 

• Declaration of vaccine production facilities (Form G). 

In 2024, 113 States Parties submitted CBM reports. Of these, 111 could be translated and analysed for references relevant to animal health. Because CBM reports contain sensitive information, information provided by States Parties are not shown here. Data on the number of CBMs containing references to animal health were categorised by CBM form, and States Parties by continent, to assess the distribution of animal health information across submissions. The results are illustrated in Figure 2. 

References to animal health information were identified across all CBM forms, most commonly in Forms A1 (49 of 113 States Parties), B (31 of 113), E (30 of 113) and G (26 of 113).  Although no single form contained a majority of submissions mentioning animal health, the level of detail varied considerably. In fact, some 2024 submissions declared no new information. These findings do not exclude the possibility that earlier CBM submissions contained animal health details that remain relevant today. 

Article X Database: Assistance Offers on Animal Health

To uphold the BWC’s provisions on cooperation and assistance [8], the Implementation Support Unit maintains a public database [9] containing offers and requests for assistance under Article X. Any State Party, or groups thereof, may advertise capacity-building projects they are willing to provide to other State Parties. Among the 34 assistance offers currently available, six relate to animal health, five of which were posted in 2024. These projects include a webinar on highly dangerous animal diseases; inspection services for animal and plant health; surveillance and response analytics developed in partnership with animal health organisations and ministries of agriculture; and broader biosecurity initiatives that encompass animal health within their mandates. While the total number of relevant offers remains limited, international cooperation under Article X provides an important means of strengthening national capacities in animal health.  

Greater involvement of animal health professionals in BWC matters offers reciprocal benefits. Increased participation enhances awareness among veterinarians, scientists and other animal health specialists of biosecurity issues. Their contributions, in turn, can help advance progress within the BWC toward global solutions that more fully account for animal risks. Although current collaboration remains modest, growing participation in Working Group sessions and the rising number of animal health projects offered through the Article X database suggests budding cooperation between the animal health and BWC communities. As the Convention moves closer to universal membership and CBM reporting becomes more commonplace, bringing in more animal-health expertise will be vital to reinforcing global resilience against biological threats. 

Disclaimer: The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations. 

Main image: ©U.S. Mission by Eric Bridiers

References 

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[6] Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO). World Livestock: Transforming the livestock sector through the Sustainable Development Goals. Rome (Italy): FAO; 2018, pp. 12. Available at: https://openknowledge.fao.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/d67a99fb-66ca-42a0-b5ac-3f907b35f09f/content (accessed on 27 October 2025). 

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[8] United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. Treaties Database. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. New York (United States of America): United Nations; 1972. Available at: https://treaties.unoda.org/t/bwc (accessed on 27 October 2025). 

[9] BWC Implementation Support Unit. BWC Article X Assistance and Cooperation Database. Geneva (Switzerland): United Nations Office at Geneva; 2017. Available at: https://bwc-articlex.unog.ch (accessed on 27 October 2025).